Despite notable past successes and a supportive policy community, Canada has not yet fully integrated mitigation into disaster management. In this paper, we argue that a greater political commitment will be necessary in order to move from a system oriented primarily toward response and recovery to one that emphasizes disaster mitigation and risk reduction. As we discuss below, however, there are several barriers that impede progress in this area.
DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION
Disaster management is a term that encompasses a range of policies and practices developed to prevent, manage and reduce the impact of disasters. It can be conceptually divided into four elements: preparedness (policies and procedures designed to facilitate an effective response to a hazard event); response (actions taken immediately before, during and after a hazard event to protect people and property and to enhance recovery); recovery (actions taken after a hazard event to restore critical systems and return a community to pre-disaster conditions); and mitigation (actions taken before or after a hazard event to reduce impacts on people and property) (Godschalk 1991; Mileti 1999) .
Historically, public policy in this area has been heavily concentrated on response, reflecting a belief that disasters are "acts of God" or "acts of Nature"unfortunate but random calamities beyond our control. This perspective has been widely rejected by disaster researchers, who instead define disasters as social phenomena which stem from interaction between two key elements: hazardstriggering agents stemming from nature, as well as from human activity and vulnerabilitiessusceptibility to injury or loss influenced by physical, social, economic, and cultural factors (see Alexander 1997; Mileti 1999; McEntire 2001; Paton and Johnston 2001) . There are many practical strategies to mitigate the two contributing variables, in order that disaster impacts might be prevented or significantly reduced. Examples of disaster mitigation efforts include structural measures such as dams or seawalls, constructed to control or contain a hazard; land-use management, such as zoning regulations which prohibit or regulate construction in hazardous areas; building regulation, including the enforcement of minimum standards for disaster resistance; and warning systems to inform people of an impending disaster.
In the international community, there is growing recognition that the focus of disaster management must shift from response and recovery toward mitigation. This idea was central to the Yokohama Strategy, a resolution adopted by delegates of the 1994 United Nations World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, which stated:
The impact of natural disasters in terms of human and economic losses has risen in recent Canadian Disaster Management Policy: Moving Toward a Paradigm Shift? 305 years, and society in general has become more vulnerable to natural disasters ... Disaster response alone is not sufficient, as it yields only temporary results at a very high cost. We have followed this limited approach for too long.... Prevention contributes to lasting improvement in safety and is essential to integrated disaster management (UNISDR 1994, 2). These objectives were reiterated and expanded at the 2005 United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction through the Hyogo Declaration, which stated:
We, delegates to the World Conference on Disaster Reduction ... are deeply concerned that communities continue to experience excessive losses of precious human lives and valuable property as well as serious injuries and major displacements due to various disasters worldwide ... We recognize as well that a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, and associated predisaster strategies, which are sound investments, must be fostered at all levels, ranging from the individual to the international levels.... We affirm that States have the primary responsibility to protect the people and property on their territory from hazards, and thus, it is vital to give high priority to disaster risk reduction in national policy, consistent with their capacities and the resources available to them (UNISDR 2005a, 1-3).
In response to these challenges, many governments around the world have changed, or are in the process of changing, their disaster management policies to explicitly emphasize mitigation. Some of these initiatives are described below.
New Zealand
Since the early 1990s, disaster management in New Zealand has been transformed from a rigid, response-oriented model to a coordinated, multi-level, all-hazard disaster management system (Jensen 1998; Britton and Clark 2000) . Through the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, the New Zealand government has promoted a national strategy that emphasizes intergovernmental cooperation and coordination for disaster management and hazard risk reduction (New Zealand. Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 2004). In 2002, existing emergency legislation was replaced with the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, which incorporates a broader focus based on principles of risk management. The act requires local authorities to organize into Civil Defence and Emergency Management Groups for the purpose of identifying, assessing, and managing hazards, including the implementation of "cost-effective risk reduction" (New Zealand 2002). 
Mitigation is one of the primary themes in New

Australia
In 2002, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) produced a report entitled Natural Disasters in Australia: Reforming Mitigation, Relief and Recovery Arrangements, which reviewed the current status of disaster management arrangements and provided a series of recommendations to shift its orientation from response and recovery to anticipation and loss reduction (COAG 2002). In particular, the report highlighted the lack of funding to implement mitigation measures identified in disaster risk management studies. In response, the Australian government has collaborated with state and local governments on the adoption of a five-year Disaster Mitigation Australia Package aimed at reforming the structure of disaster management in the country, including a shift beyond relief and recovery toward disaster mitigation. At the heart of this initiative, the Australian government has budgeted approximately $45 million for a five-year Natural Disaster Mitigation Programme, which matches federal funds with state and local contributions for approved local mitigation projects, such as "the purchase of land and/or buildings in high risk areas, disaster proofing prone buildings, installing disaster warning systems and implementing engineering works" (LGA 2004). Hurricane Katrina has sparked renewed interest in mitigation, but has also raised questions about the adequacy of current efforts. While reductions in funding or poor administration might be partially to blame for the failure of parts of the local flood protection infrastructure in New Orleans, the event's impacts also illustrate the limits of structural controls and the need for broader thinking about the root causes of disasters. Similarities in the ideas, objectives, and instruments which are being incorporated into disaster management in these and other countries suggest a significant shift from the way governments have approached the disaster problem historically. These cases illustrate gradual acceptance of a new paradigm which recognizes that, while hazards will never be eliminated, there are many things that can and should be done to reduce vulnerabilities and to minimize disaster losses. In their current form, Canada's disaster assistance programs do not encourage mitigation and fail to address the underlying factors that contribute to disasters in the first place (i.e., hazards and vulnerability). Paying for disaster losses without addressing root causes sets the stage for repeat losses and can create perverse incentives that reinforce high-risk decisions and behaviour. Wright and Rossi argue that postdisaster relief provisions punish risk-averters and reward risk-takers; the wise and cautious, that is, are made to pay for the folly, shortsightedness, and simple bad luck of others. Thus these policies encourage the rehabitation of hazardous areas after disaster has struck, because they absolve individuals from any responsibility for the risk (1981, 50). Why? In this section, we identify several barriers that impede the development of mitigation strategies.
United States
United Kingdom A series of major crises in the United
DISASTER MITIGATION IN
Uncertainty Regarding Hazards and Vulnerabilities
Moving toward mitigation requires an assessment of the hazards and vulnerabilities that policies are intended to address. Though policymakers can draw on a strong base of Canadian research on hazards and vulnerabilities, considerable uncertainty still surrounds these variables.
Hazards
Broadly defined, a hazard is "any potential threat to something that people value, including one's life, Burton, Kates and White (1993) identify at least seven distinct characteristics of hazards, each of which adds to the complexity of the disaster problem and complicates policy-making. For example, the magnitude of a hazard (its size, relative to past events or to a certain threshold) limits the options available to prevent or mitigate its impacts; its frequency (how often a given hazard is expected to occur within a long-run average) influences the urgency of strategies required to deal with it; and its areal extent (the space affected) influences the range of stakeholders involved in the policy process. Furthermore, our ability to predict hazards is limited. There are two types of predictions: deterministic predictionsthe expected occurrence of a particular hazard with specific characteristics and within a short, defined time interval; and statistical
predictionsprobabilistic predictions of the likely occurrence of hazards within a particular time period, such as a season or a decade (McBean 2000; Sarewitz, Pielke Jr. and Byerly 2000). For weather and weather-related hazards, skill for deterministic predictions is good for several days and decreases to zero by about two weeks. Relatively good statistical predictions can be made for seasons and in
response to a changing climate. While there is skill in producing statistical predictions for geophysical hazards such as earthquakes, there is little skill for deterministic predictions (i.e., we can predict whether or not they will happen, but not when they will occur). For the most part, however, we simply do not have a sufficient capability to accurately pre-dict where and when hazard events will occur or to anticipate their magnitude or intensity.
Vulnerabilities
Though a common conceptualization of vulnerability remains elusive (Weichselgartner 2001), the following definition captures much of its complexity:
Vulnerability to disasters is a function of human action and behaviour. It describes the degree to which a socio-economic system or physical assets are either susceptible or resilient to the impact of natural hazards. It is determined by a combination of several factors, including awareness of hazards, the condition of human settlements and infrastructure, public policy and administration, the wealth of a given society and organized abilities in all fields of disaster and risk management. The specific dimensions of social, economic and political vulnerability are also related to inequalities, often related to gender relations, economic patterns, and ethnic or racial divisions. It is also largely dependent on development practices that do not take into account the susceptibility to natural hazards (UNISDR 2001, 4).
A broad base of research on vulnerability has been developed in fields such as environment and development studies, climate-change science and risk management, but there remains significant conceptual confusion regarding the meaning of vulnerability and the factors that contribute to vulnerability (Brooks 2003). As Weichselgartner (2001)
points out, even if we limit the scope to disaster management literature, there are several distinct "themes" of vulnerability. For example, vulnerability can be conceptualized as a product of pre-existing conditions that contribute to the impact of a disaster, such as proximity to hazards or the value of property at risk. In this context, a mitigation strategy would target the myriad factors that make people vulnerable to hazard events, a formidable exercise indeed. Vulnerability can also be seen as the degree Canadian Disaster Management Policy: Moving Toward a Paradigm Shift? 311 to which people are able to cope with the impacts of hazard events (Blaikie et al. 1994 ). Coping capacity is influenced by a wide range of factors, such as age, socio-economic conditions or level of education, but these variables cannot be used to predict vulnerability consistently; for example, where age may be correlated with higher vulnerability in one context, it may actually reduce vulnerability in other contexts (Paton and Johnston 2001) .
The complexity of the vulnerability variable and our limited ability to predict the location and magnitude of future hazard events pose considerable challenges for policymakers. Given the uncertainty inherent in either variable, it is not entirely surprising to find that disaster management policies continue to reflect a perspective of disasters as random, unexpected events, to be addressed only if and when they occur. (e.g., Mileti 1999) . Case studies by FEMA in the United States suggest that mitigation consistently produces savings in postdisaster relief and recovery (FEMA 1999). According to the Government of Queensland, Australia, "every $1 spent on disaster mitigation saves at least $3 in economic and social recovery costs" (Queensland 2001).
Uncertain Benefits and Costs Disaster researchers generally agree that mitigation is a winning investment
Regrettably, however, policymakers have no Canadian study that comprehensively assesses the costs and benefits of mitigation.
Disaster management in Canada follows a "bottom-up" approach, where policy is presumed to be defined, formulated, and implemented locally.
However, the limited discourse on local disaster management indicates that this is a particularly problematic area for local policymakers (Wolensky and
Wolensky 1990). Given the uncertainties outlined above, local political actors often have difficulty in seeing the potential benefits of mitigation. In the absence of specific predictions regarding future hazards or evidence of an imminent threat, local governments are reluctant to invest in preventative measures. Any benefits associated with mitigation (which are only realized in the event of a disaster) must be weighed against immediate and potentially significant costs (Godschalk and Brower 1985) . For example, more stringent building codes may ensure greater structural resistance to hazards, but they may also force builders to adopt different methods and utilize different materials, both of which could raise the cost of construction. Prohibiting development in hazard-prone areas like floodplains can reduce the probability of loss, but it can also mean forgoing revenue from development charges and property taxes, two sources of revenue on which many local governments depend.3
Lack of Public Demand
Except in jurisdictions where disasters occur frequently, citizens generally perceive a low probability of loss associated with hazards (Larsson and Enander 1997; Tierney, Lindell and Perry 2001) and thus show little interest in disaster planning or loss reduction (Cigler 1988). As a result, elected officials have few political incentives to allocate scarce time and resources to mitigation, when it is weighed against other competing priorities (Wright and Rossi 1981).
Immediately following a disasterafter vulnerabilities have been starkly exposed through disruption, loss of life and property damagethere is often greater interest in disaster management and this offers policymakers an opportunity to implement mitigation measures (Berke, Kartez and Wenger 1993; Rubin and Popkin 1993). However, the post-disaster policy window is transitory and becomes quickly obscured by the primary goal: to return the community to normalcy as swiftly as possible (Solecki and Michaels 1994) . Soon after a disaster, people return to their pre-disaster risk perceptions and behaviourin most cases, they then tend to underestimate the probability that they will be impacted again (Cigler 1988 , 43-44 Outage Task Force. After analyzing data and hearing testimony from people involved before, during, and after the event, members produce a report, usually with specific recommendations (which may or may not be implemented) regarding how similar disasters can be prevented, avoided or minimized. However, the scope of inquiry for these bodies is usually restricted to a particular sector, hazard or even to a single event. As a result, they rarely address wider questions that might emerge from a more aggregate view of the Canadian disaster problem, such as: What is the public interest in the context of disasters? How should governments manage the disaster problem? Are there alternative approaches that could reduce the physical, social, and economic impacts of disasters before they happen? Yet it is precisely this deeper analysis that is required in order to turn "lessons learned" into concrete and effective policy responses.
In the United States, disaster-related research has a strong presence; several universities have wellestablished research institutes dedicated to the study of hazards and disaster management (e.g., the Natural Hazards Centre at the University of Colorado and the Disaster Research Centre at the University of Delaware). A recent report commissioned by PSEPC reveals that there are many Canadian researchers with an interest in disasters (COMPAS 2003), but interaction within the research community has not evolved to the same extent as it has in the United States. Those who most strongly advocate mitigation in their individual research have yet to form a strong coalition to lobby for more proactive disaster policies.
Fragmented Incentives and Resources and Lack of Political Will
Intergovernmental collaboration is considered essential for the development and implementation of policies for disaster mitigation (Mushkatel and Weschler 1985) , but it is difficult to organize and sustain (Wolensky and Wolensky 1990) . Local governments are perhaps best positioned to implement mitigation due to their close proximity to hazards and because they control many of the most effective tools to reduce vulnerability to hazards, such as land-use regulation and building-code enforcement (Prater and Lindell 2000; Newkirk 2001 ). However, because the probability of a disaster in any particular community is low, local officials are least likely to see mitigation as a pressing priority (Wright and Rossi 1981; Cigler 1988) . Moreover, because most of the financial costs of recovery after a disaster are shouldered by insurers and senior governments, local governments appear to have weak economic incentives to invest in lossreduction measures.
The Government of Canada has substantial resources and strong economic incentives to mitigate local disaster losses, but lacks the administrative apparatus to implement mitigation unilaterally. Moreover, Ottawa's attempts to deal directly with municipalities have often been resisted by the provinces (Canada 2004, 41-42) . Thus, it is provincial governments that seem to play a pivotal role in influencing local mitigation, since they are constitutionally empowered to intervene directly or to mandate this responsibility to local governments. Yet provincial politicians also seem reluctant; only a handful of provinces require mitigation as a component of local disaster management.
The recent devastation brought about by Hurricane Katrina in the United States illustrates that mandates passed down from senior governments and
mitigation funding programs must also be accompanied by a sustained, multi-level commitment to implementation. In this case, poor organization and administration of state mitigation efforts and insufficient local political will to implement Canadian Disaster Management Policy: Moving Toward a Paradigm Shift? 313 mitigation measures both appear to have weakened Louisiana's capacity to resist and cope with this type of event, despite the fact that it was predicted well in advance (Schleifstein and McQuaid 2002) .
The Context of Disaster Policy-making Political interest in disaster management is greatest immediately following a disaster and it is in this period that most disaster management policy is formulated. However, in the aftermath of a disaster extensive media coverage creates strong political pressure for elected officials to quickly help disaster victims. As a result, post-disaster policy decisions often involve expanding eligibility parameters for disaster assistance programs, which virtually guarantees higher disaster recovery assistance costs in the future. May and Williams call this the "political dilemma of disaster policy-making":
On the one hand, the politically most popular policyexpanding federal disaster relief assistanceis both costly and does little to control longer-run growth of disaster losses. On the other hand, the policies which are believed to be most effective in these latter respectspreparedness and mitigationare politically less salient and therefore unlikely to receive much attention (May and Williams 1986, 3) .
For this reason, it is better to make policies for disaster mitigation during "normal" periods, where there is less political pressure to act quickly and where policy can be formulated without specific reference to the most recent catastrophic event. As illustrated above, however, it is difficult to get political leaders interested in mitigation in the absence of a recent disaster or an imminent threat.
CHANGES ON THE HORIZON?
Despite these rather formidable barriers, progress in many areas suggests that they may not be insurmountable.
Uncertainty. An expanding body of research on hazards and vulnerabilities in Canada is eroding the uncertainty that frustrates decision-making in the context of disasters. One notable initiative in this area is the Canadian Natural Hazards Assessment Project, a joint effort among the Meteorological Service of Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada and the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, which was undertaken to identify natural hazards in Canada and to assess points of vulnerability as a basis for policy-making (Environment Canada 2002). In addition, more information on hazards and vulnerabilities is likely to percolate from the local level, as recent legislation in Ontario and Quebec requires local governments to identify the hazards in their environment, estimate the risk associated with these hazards and assess points at which the community is most vulnerable to these hazards (Ontario 2002; Quebec 2000) . Public Demand. Despite a general lack of interest in disaster management, citizens nevertheless see major disaster losses as unacceptable and look to governments to manage disasters (Schneider 1995; Dunlop 2004 ). Moreover, the imperative for disaster management and mitigation is increasingly cast in terms of citizens' rights. After the 1997 Red River flood, for example, a report by the International Joint Commission stated that residents "have a right to expect that governments at all levels will show leadership and provide guidance in the development and implementation of mitigation measures, including sustained actions to reduce or eliminate long-term risk from flooding and its effects" (IJC 2000, 42) . This implies that governments face a higher standard of care in making decisions about disaster management.
Benefits and Costs of
In the United States, there have been cases in which disaster-affected residents have perceived that their local government was negligent in mitigating hazard risk and have sought compensation through the courts (Kusler 1985; Hutcheson 2003) . Though cases like this have not yet emerged in Canada, Roman (2002) suggests that municipal governments could potentially be found negligent if they fail to implement reasonable measures to prevent or reduce the impacts of hazard events, based on "such factors as the nature and extent of the risk and the ease with which it could have been reduced or eliminated" (Roman 2002, 7-8 ).
As the climate changes, it is predicted that the frequency and intensity of weather-related hazards like floods will increase. Does not evidence of a changing climate and increasingly hazardous natural environment demand a higher standard of care, obligating governments to do more to protect people and their property before a disaster occurs?
FUTURE CHALLENGES
Over many years, Canada has developed effective response systems to ensure that disasters result in few casualties, and disaster assistance programs to facilitate speedy recovery from disaster impacts, but disaster mitigation has not yet been fully integrated Canadian Disaster Management Policy: Moving Toward a Paradigm Shift? 315 into disaster management. With a long history of experience with disasters and a supportive policy community, Canada has the capacity to be a world leader in disaster mitigation, but a strong, long-term political commitment will be required to shift the orientation of Canadian disaster management toward the prevention or reduction of disaster impacts. From disaster research, we know how disaster impacts can be mitigated, but as this paper illustrates, there are a number of political barriers which have delayed the full incorporation of mitigation into disaster management policy.
Recent messages from Public Safety and Emer-
gency Preparedness Canada suggest that new federal emergency legislation may soon be drafted to include mitigation (Cullen 2004 ); this would be a strong, symbolic first step toward the development of a national disaster mitigation strategy. However, implementing the strategy will require sustained commitment from a wide range of public and private sector actors and organizations, and will be a major challenge in multi-level governance. Encouraging lessons might be drawn from collaborative intergovernmental approaches that are developing in other policy fields such as health care and the environment (Cameron and Simeon 2002) . Perhaps the greatest achievement in both the Red River Floodway project and the National Flood Damage Reduction Program was that these projects engaged all three levels of government in a strategy to reduce disaster impacts; lessons from these projects might provide guidance for a more comprehensive disaster mitigation effort.
Each year, Canadians in one region or another are affected by disasters. Changes in the hazard variable (e.g., due to global climate change) and the vulnerability variable (e.g., higher population densities, more property at risk) indicate that the magnitude of disasters we have experienced to date may be exceeded by those in the future. In the international community, a paradigm shift from recovery to prevention is underway in disaster management. How will Canada respond? NOTES 'The term "paradigm" was originally used by Thomas Kuhn to describe an enduring set of ideas shared by members of a natural science community. In public policy analysis, the term denotes a relatively long-term set of assumptions, beliefs, values, and attitudes that shapes the way policymakers perceive a public problem and limits the range of solutions that they consider in response (Campbell 1998 ; Howlett and Ramesh 2003, 232-33) . In order for disaster management policy to be expanded to include mitigation, the current, response-centric paradigm must shift to one that defines disasters as a social problem and permits a wider array of possible solutions. 
